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Joined cases T-125/03 and 253/03, AKZO Noble Chemicals Ltd v Ackros 
Chemicals Ltd v Commission, judgment of 17 September 2007, not yet 
reported (under appeal) 
 
Dr Arianna Andreangeli, Lecturer in Law 
Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The definition of the scope of legal professional privilege (hereinafter referred 
to also as LPP) in EC law has long been debated.1   The ECJ was criticised for 
adopting a restrictive notion of the privilege, limited only to communications 
emanating from independent counsel, namely, a legal adviser who is not 
linked to his or her client by a relationship of employment.2  Therefore, 
repeated calls have been made in favour of the extension of this safeguard to 
correspondence originated from in-house lawyers.3  The enactment of the 
Modernisation Regulation (hereinafter referred to also as Regulation No 
1/2003)4 has added momentum to this debate, due to the emphasis placed by 
the Regulation on the close cooperation between the Commission and the 
National Competition Authorities (hereinafter referred to also as NCAs), 
including the power to exchange and use as evidence information gathered 
                                                 

 Heartfelt thanks are owed to Prof Fiona Beveridge, of the University of Liverpool, for her feedback 
on an earlier draft of this paper.  The author is the sole responsible for any errors or omissions. 
1
 See, e.g., FENNELLY, “Lawyers and employed lawyers: the Application of Legal Professional 
privilege”, (1998) 1 Irish Bus. L.  2; CARR, “Should in-house lawyers have lawyer-client privilege?”, 
(1996) 24 Int’l Business Lawyer 522; FAULL, “In-house lawyers and legal professional privilege: a 
problem revisited”, (1998) 4 Colum. J. of Eur. L. 139; HILL, “A problem of privilege: in-house 
counsel and the attorney-client privilege in the United States and the European Community”, (1995) 27 
Case W. Res. J. of Int’l L. 145; CHRISTOFOROU, “Protection of legal privilege in EEC competition 
law: the imperfections of a case”, (1985-86) 9 Fordham Int L J 1.  More recently, see GIPPINI 
FOURNIER, “Legal professional privilege in competition proceedings before the European 
Commission: beyond the cursory glance”, (2005) 28 Fordham Int’l L J 967; VESTERDORF, “Legal 
Professional Privilege and the Privilege against self-incrimination in EC Law: recent developments and 
current issues”, in HAWK (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy: Annual Proceedings of the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2005: New York, Juris Publishing, p. 701. 
2
Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities, [1982] ECR 
1575. 
3
 See, e.g., JOSHUA, “Privilege in multi-jurisdictional cartel investigations: are European courts 
missing the point?”, (2004) 7 Global Comp. Rev. 39; POWER, “Representing clients after the 
Modernisation of EC Competition law”, (2003) 14 ICCLR 335; LAMBERT, “Parallel Antitrust 
investigations: the long arm of the DOJ from the perspective of an EU defence counsel”, (2002) 14 
Loy. Consumer L. Rev.509. 
4
 Council Regulation No 1 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1/1. 
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during competition proceedings,5 and to the conferral to the Commission itself 
of wider powers of investigation.6   
         Against this background, although the interim order in the case of AKZO 
Nobel and Ackros Chemicals v Commission7 had been saluted as potentially 
paving the way for a reformulation of the privilege on the basis of the 
allegiance to rules of professional conduct enforced by independent 
organisations in the public interest,8 the CFI judgment handed down in 
September 20079 reaffirmed the existing position, as enshrined in the ECJ 
A.M. & S. v Commission10 decision.   
         This case note will examine the judgment of the CFI in AKZO Nobel and 
Ackros Chemicals v Commission.  After a brief outline of the proceedings and 
especially of the 2004 interim order, it will show that, by affirming the right of 
the investigated undertakings to challenge the decision of the Commission 
rejecting their claim for privilege before the Community Courts,11 the CFI 
sought to ensure that appropriate safeguards be in place to avoid disclosure of 
privileged communications through the continuous judicial supervision over the 
Commission’s investigative measures. 
         The case note will also illustrate the wider implications of the judgment 
for the role and function of the legal profession in EC law.  It will be argued 
that, by reaffirming the concept of privilege enshrined in the A.M & S. 
judgment, the CFI adhered to the view that, to fulfil his or her function of 
providing legal advice in the interest of the sound administration of justice, a 
lawyer would not only have to be authorised to practise in one of the Member 
States and thus bound to observe rules of professional ethics applied in the 
public interest, but must also be free from any relationship of employment, and 
thus of economic dependence, with his or her client.   
                                                 
5
 Article 12, Council Regulation No 1/2003. 
6
 See, inter alia, VESTERDORF, “Legal Professional Privilege and the Privilege against self-
incrimination in EC Law: recent developments and current issues”, in HAWK (Ed.), International 
Antitrust Law and Policy: Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2005: New 
York, Juris Publishing, p. 701; ANDERANGELI, “The impact of the Modernisation regulation on the 
guarantees of due process in competition proceedings”, (2006) 31 (3) ELRev 342.  
7
 Case T-125/03, AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2003] ECR 
II-4771. 
8
 Id., para. 126. 
9
 Case T-125/03, AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, judgment of 
17 September 2007, not yet reported.  For commentary, see, inter alia, Case comment, (2008) 12(1) 
Int’l J. of Ev. & Proof 72; MYKOLAITIS, “Developments of legal professional privilege under 
AKZO/Ackros judgment”, (2008) 14(1) Int’l J. of Trade & R. 1. 
10
Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities, [1982] ECR 
1575. 
11
See id., para. 46-48. 
 3 
         However, it will be questioned whether accepting this “negative” concept 
of independence, as opposed to a “positive” one, based on the allegiance to 
positive ethical standards,12 is still consistent with the needs of the framework 
for the enforcement of the EC competition rules.  It will be shown that the 
forthcoming appeal judgment of the ECJ13 constitutes a turning point, since it is 
going to clarify the requirements of LPP in Community law and overall, how to 
balance the apparently conflicting interests in, respectively, the effective 
enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty and in the protection of the rights 
of defence of the undertakings concerned, of which LPP is an essential part.  
 
2. Background: the 2004 interim order 
 
As is well known,14 the AKZO Nobel litigation15 originated from the seizure by 
Commission officials, in the course of an investigation ordered in accordance 
with Article 14 of Regulation 17/62, of two sets of documents which the 
investigated parties claimed were covered by LPP.  One set of documents, 
referred to as “Set A”, was represented by a memorandum recording internal 
discussions between the general counsel of Ackros Chemicals and other 
employees of the company and addressed to a member of the senior 
management.  The applicant claimed that the records had been made for the 
purpose of seeking legal advice from independent counsel in relation to the 
existing compliance programme.   
         “Set B”, instead, was made up of a number of preparatory handwritten 
notes taken by the company’s general manager, used as a “background” to set 
A, as well as of a number of emails between AKZO’s general manager and the 
company’s “competition law coordinator”, who was a Dutch advocaat, that is, 
an in-house attorney authorised to practise as a member of the Netherlands 
Bar.  After hearing the parties’ representations, the officials concluded that they 
could not reach a definitive decision on the nature of the set A documents and, 
                                                 
12
 Case T-125/03, AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, judgment of 
17 September 2007, not yet reported, para. 167-168. 
13
 Case 550/07 P: Appeal brought on 8 December 2007 by AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros 
Chemicals Ltd against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) delivered on 
17 September 2007 in Case T-253/03: Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ld and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v the 
Commission of the European Communities, [2008] OJ C37/19. 
 
14
 For an account of the facts of the case and of the interim order, see, inter alia, MURPHY, “CFI 
signals possible extension of professional privilege to in-house lawyers”, (2004) 25(7) ECLR 447. 
15
 Case T-125/03, AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2003] ECR 
II-4771, para. 6-7. 
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accordingly, placed their copies in a sealed envelope.16  In respect of Set B, 
namely the memorandum recording conversations with lower level employees 
and the emails, the officials were in no doubt that they could not benefit from 
privilege; consequently, they were copied and placed on the file.17 
         The applicants impugned the final decision rejecting the claim for 
privilege18  and also sought the suspension of the operation of the decisions 
ordering the inspections and sought to oblige the Commission to place both 
sets of documents in a sealed envelope pending the resolution of the dispute.19 
         The President of the CFI recalled20 that, in accordance with the ECJ 
decision in A.M. & S.,21 the powers conferred on the Commission by Regulation 
17 were not unlimited, but should be interpreted as safeguarding the secrecy of 
the communications between a lawyer and his or her client, providing such 
communications are made “for the purposes and in the interest of the client’s 
rights of defence and (…) emanate from independent lawyers, i.e. lawyers who 
are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment.”22   
         The protection of lawyer-client confidentiality was strictly related to the 
need to safeguard, in the context of competition enforcement by the 
Commission, the rights of the defence enjoyed by the investigated 
undertakings, of which it constituted an essential corollary.23  That secrecy was, 
in the light of A.M. &S.,24 “intimately linked to the conception of the lawyer’s role 
as collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts” and was aimed at 
allowing the provision of legal advice to the client “in full independence and in 
the overriding interest of that cause (…)”.25 
         The interim order acknowledged that in this context “it may prove 
necessary (…) for the client to prepare working or summary documents” 
detailing factual information, often of a complex nature, required for the 
purpose of enabling counsel to provide legal advice in full knowledge of the 
                                                 
16
 Id., para. 8. 
17
 Id., para. 10-11. 
18
 Id., para. 14. 
19
 Id., para. 32. 
20
 Id., para. 95. 
21
 Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities, [1982] ECR 
1575. 
22
 Id., para. 21. 
23
 Case T-125/03, AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2003] ECR 
II-4771, para. 99-100. 
24
 See case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities, [1982] ECR 
1575, para. 24. 
25
Case T-125/03, AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2003] ECR 
II-4771, para. 101.  
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factual circumstances and the context of the case.26  Therefore, it was held that 
the rights of defence enjoyed by the investigated parties would be prima facie 
irremediably impaired if the Commission could seize copies of documents 
prepared by the investigated parties solely for the purpose of exercising their 
rights of the defence by seeking advice from their lawyer.27  It was thus 
concluded that in principle, this type of evidence could benefit from LPP.28 
         In relation to the disclosure of the set A documents, namely the 
“typewritten memoranda (…) drafted in the context of a competition law 
compliance” for the purpose of seeking advice from independent counsel,29 the 
President of the CFI recognised that the mere existence of a compliance 
programme created by an independent counsel was not sufficient to prove that 
any document prepared in its context would be privileged.30   
         However, he stated that, in view of their purpose, content and scope, it 
could not in principle be excluded that they may be privileged.31  In fact, they 
had been prepared exclusively to obtain legal advice from an independent 
lawyer, concerned relevant matters of competition law32 and especially facts 
that justified the need to consult a legal adviser for the purpose of preparing a 
framework for the exercise of the client’s rights of the defence.33 
         With respect to set B, major problems arose in respect of the emails 
exchanged between Ackros’s General Manager and AKZO Nobel’s in-house 
counsel.  Although the President acknowledged that, since the legal adviser 
was in a relationship of permanent employed, the communications emanating 
from him were not in principle privileged,34 he also pointed out that the concept 
of privilege emerging from the A.M. & S. case was based on “the interpretation 
of the principles common to the Member States dating from 1982”.35  
         The order acknowledged that these principles had evolved, at least in 
some of the Member States, in the sense of extending the protection of 
confidentiality to written communications emanating from employed legal 
                                                 
26
 Id., para. 102. 
27
 Id., para. 104. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Id., para. 106. 
30
 Id., para. 106-107. 
31
 Id., para. 109. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Id., para. 113. See also, mutatis mutandis, case T-30/89, Hilti AG v Commission (interim order), 
[1990] ECR II-163, para. 17-18.  
34
Case T-125/03, AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, [2003] ECR 
II-4771, para. 119. 
35
 Id., para. 122. 
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advisers, provided that they were subject to the observance of rules of 
professional conduct.36   
         As a result, it was held that, even though it was indispensable to avoid 
the situation where the extension of the cover of privilege could result in 
“abuses which would enable evidence of an infringement of the Treaty 
competition rules to be concealed”,37 the applicants had provided the Court with 
a prima facie case that the role of independent lawyers as auxiliaries to the 
courts in the administration of justice could also be exercised by employed 
lawyers who were also subject to “strict rules of professional conduct.”38 
         In the case at hand, the lawyer was a “a member of the Netherlands Bar, 
subject to professional obligations as regards independence and respect for 
the rules of the Bar comparable to those of an external lawyer”.39  Accordingly, 
it was concluded that there could not be any presumption that the existence of 
a relationship of employment with the client could adversely affect the 
independence necessary for the fulfilment of the lawyer’s function in the 
context of the administration of justice, providing he or she be bound to strict 
professional standards commensurate to his or her status.40 
         The interim order also found that the applicants had disclosed a prima 
facie case41 that the procedure employed by the Commission officials to assess 
the nature of the communications might be incompatible with the protection of 
the rights of defence enjoyed by the investigated parties.42  The President of 
the CFI took the view that when an allegation of privilege was made, the party 
concerned would not be obliged to disclose the document in dispute, but must 
only provide the Commission with “relevant material” capable of substantiating 
that claim.43  If the Commission, however, was minded to reject that claim, it 
could not examine the document without first having given the investigated 
undertaking the opportunity to challenge its decision before the CFI.44   
         Accordingly, and unless the investigated parties had granted consent to 
disclose the evidence, the Commission officials could not cast that “cursory 
glance” and would have no other alternative but to place the document in a 
                                                 
36
 Id., para. 124. 
37
 Id., para. 121. 
38
 Id., para. 125. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Id., para. 126. 
41
 Id., para. 143, 146-148. 
42
 Id., paras. 132 ff. 
43
 Id., para. 132-133. 
44
 Id., para. 134. 
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sealed envelope to avoid a breach of confidentiality.45  Although the order in 
AKZO Nobel may have appeared a “modest procedural victory for the 
applicants”46 its potential for a future redefinition of legal professional privilege 
could not be overlooked. The reasoning of President Vesterdorf seemed to 
support the view that the scope of professional privilege should be defined 
solely on the basis of the allegiance of the lawyer to binding rules of ethics.47 
         However, the ECJ annulled the CFI’s interim order on the grounds of lack 
of urgency.  The Court opined that the “mere reading” of the communication in 
question “without that information being used” as evidence,48 despite being in 
principle “capable of affecting professional privilege”,49 was not “sufficient to 
establish the existence of serious and irreparable harm”50 only because the 
Commission officials had already “cast their cursory glance” over the 
documents.51  Nonetheless, the ECJ order left open the question whether the 
possibility for the investigating officials to examine, even cursorily, documents 
whose privileged nature is alleged, is consistent with the effective protection of 
lawyer-client confidentiality.52   
         In the light of the above analysis, the final judgment was widely awaited, 
since it would have provided the CFI’s “definitive word” on whether the 
Community notion of LPP should be extended to include communications 
originating from employed counsel and on the procedure that the Commission 
should follow to assess the nature of allegedly privileged evidence.  The CFI 
decision will be analysed in the next section. 
 
3. The AKZO Nobel and Ackros judgment 
 
The previous section illustrated how the AKZO Nobel interim order fostered the 
expectation that the CFI would reformulate the A.M. & S. test for legal 
                                                 
45
 Id., para. 139-140. 
46
 MURPHY, “CFI signals possible extension of professional privilege to in-house lawyers”, (2004) 25 
ECLR 447 at 453. 
47
 HILL, “A problem of privilege: in-house counsel and the attorney-client privilege in the United 
States and the European Community”, (1995) 27 Case W. Res. J.  of Int’l L. 145 at 191. 
48
 Case C-7/04 P (R), Commission v AKZO Nobel and Ackros Chemicals, [2004] ECR I-8739, para. 43. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid.  For commentary, see GIPPINI FOURNIER, “Legal professional privilege in competition 
proceedings before the European Commission: beyond the cursory glance”, (2005) 28 Fordham Int’l L 
J 967, p. 1023-1025. 
52
 Inter alia, DEKEYSER and GAUER, “The new enforcement system for articles 81 and 82 and the 
rights of the defence”, in HAWK (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy, 2005: New York, Juris 
Publishing, p. 549 at 572. 
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professional privilege so as to take into account the changes evident in the 
laws of some Member States in respect to the position of in-house counsel.  
However, the CFI preferred to reiterate the existing test.  It confirmed that the 
A.M. & S. concept of privilege53 was consistent with a requirement of “negative 
independence” of counsel, focused on the absence of links with his or her client 
and not with a “positive” idea of autonomy, based on “membership of a Bar or 
Law Society”, as a result of which the legal adviser would be “subject to 
professional discipline and ethics”.54 
         The CFI also dismissed the argument that the changes in the laws of 
some Member States since 1982 had resulted in a substantial change of the 
status of employed counsel for the purpose of LPP.55  It noted that the 
protection of lawyer-client confidentiality was still withheld from in-house 
counsel in a number of jurisdictions56 and that employed legal advisers were 
denied the possibility to join local “Bars” or “Law Societies” in several Member 
States.57   
         The Court was left unconvinced by the arguments, advanced by the 
applicants and by some of the interveners, that “the personal scope of the 
Community concept of confidentiality should be governed by national law.”58  It 
took the different view that, since the protection of secrecy of lawyer-client 
correspondence “directly affects the conditions under which the Commission 
may act in a field as vital to the functioning of the common market as that of 
compliance with the rules on competition”,59 the application of conditions laid 
down by national law would jeopardise the effective exercise of the 
Commission’s enforcement powers in individual cases and would ultimately be 
incompatible with the supremacy of EC law.60 
         The CFI emphasised that the privilege constituted an exception to the 
extensive investigation powers enjoyed by the Commission and aimed at 
targeting the most serious infringements of the Treaty competition rules.61  It 
stated that although the enactment of Regulation No 1/2003 had increased the 
importance of self-assessment of potentially anti-competitive commercial 
                                                 
53
Joined cases T-125/03 and 253/03, AKZO Nobel Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, 
judgment of 17 September 2007, not yet reported, para. 167.   
54
 Id., para. 168. 
55
 Id., para. 173. 
56
 Id., para. 171. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Id., para. 176. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Id., para. 172. 
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practices and of “compliance programmes”, due to the abolition of the 
notification system, it had not affected the role of, respectively, in-house and 
independent counsel.62   
         The Court thus held that any such “exercise of self-assessment” could 
still be carried out by independent lawyers in constant liaison with the 
undertakings’ legal departments, just as was the case under Regulation No 
17/62.63  Accordingly, any communications exchanged between outside legal 
advisers and their in-house counterparts would be “in principle protected under 
LPP, provided that they are made for the purpose of the undertaking’s exercise 
of the rights of defence.”64  
         The judgment also examined the issues arising from the procedure 
followed by the Commission to assess whether evidence gathered in the 
course of its investigations could qualify for LPP.  The CFI indicated that the 
decision determining whether the documents seized from the investigated 
parties should be protected by LPP constituted a “reviewable act” for the 
purpose of bringing an action under Article 230 EC Treaty.65 It held that this 
decision brought to an end an ad hoc procedure aimed at examining the 
nature, whether privileged or otherwise, of the evidence in dispute66 and 
consequently produced irreversible legal consequences for the undertakings’ 
rights of defence.67 
         The CFI recognised that once the Commission had struck down the 
investigated parties’ allegations that the document or documents are privileged, 
the consequences of the decision could not be made good by its later 
annulment.68  Accordingly, it stated that the investigated undertakings should 
be entitled to lodge an appeal against the decision both when the latter had 
been adopted expressly and when the Commission had tacitly overridden the 
claim for LPP by seizing the document and placing it on the investigation file 
without taking a formal decision on its nature.69 
         The AKZO Nobel judgment also considered the issues arising from the 
practice of “casting a cursory glance” at the documents in dispute.  The CFI 
held that an undertaking wishing to claim that evidence is covered by privilege, 
                                                 
62
 Id., para. 173. 
63
 Ibid.   
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Id., para. 45, 48. 
66
 Id., para. 46. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid. 
69
 Id., para. 49. 
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despite not being obliged to disclose its contents,70 would still be bound to 
produce sufficient and relevant material to support its claim.71  As a result, if the 
Commission considered that the information adduced was not sufficient to 
ground a claim for privilege, it would be entitled to order the production of the 
actual documents and to cast a “cursory look” at them to establish whether they 
are privileged on the basis of external indicia such as the “layout, heading, title 
or other superficial features”.72   
         However, the Court recognised that there may be instances in which 
even casting a “cursory glance” on the evidence could irremediably prejudice 
the undertakings’ rights of the defence because the nature of the evidence may 
not be immediately apparent from the external characteristics of the 
documents.73  In these cases, the Commission should place the documents in 
a sealed envelope with a view to it being reopened at a later stage for the 
purpose of resolving the matter.74   
         The CFI stated that, in any event, the Commission officials should not 
read the contested evidence until such time as the undertaking concerned has 
had the opportunity to challenge the decision and, if an action is brought, until 
the Court has handed down a judgment.75  To hold otherwise would 
irremediably impair the right of the investigated undertakings to consult a 
lawyer without constraint, since the harm resulting from the disclosure of 
privileged documents could not be made good by challenging the final 
decision.76  On this point, it was stated: 
 
“Even if that document is not used as evidence in a decision imposing a 
penalty under the competition rules (…) [it] might be used by the 
Commission, directly or indirectly, in order to obtain new information or 
new evidence without the undertaking in question always being able to 
identify or prevent such information or evidence from being used against 
it.”77 
 
                                                 
70
 Id., para. 79. 
71
 Ibid.. 
72
 Id., para. 81. 
73
 Id., para. 83. 
74
 Id., para. 83. 
75
 Id., para. 88. 
76
 Id., para. 87. 
77
 Ibid.. 
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         In the light of the above analysis, the AKZO Nobel judgment appears to 
disappoint somewhat the expectation that the CFI would take the opportunity to 
reformulate in a more generous manner the notion of LPP in Community law, 
since the Court refrained from replacing the “negative” concept of 
independence of the lawyer, which was at the basis of the A.M. & S. test, with a 
“positive” notion of that independence based on the allegiance to rules of 
conduct enforced in the public interest to ensure the proper functioning of the 
legal profession.78   
         However, although the Court declined to revise the existing requirements 
of privilege, the judgment remains very significant since it clarified the 
procedure which the Commission officials should adopt in respect of claims 
that evidence collected in the course of investigations are covered by LPP.  It 
also stated that, whether it is taken expressly or tacitly, namely by annexing 
documents to the file without placing them in a sealed envelope, a decision 
resulting in privilege being denied constitutes an act open to challenge before 
the Luxembourg courts.  The next section will therefore assess the impact of 
the AKZO Nobel judgment on the effective protection of the right to the 
confidentiality of lawyer-client communications in the context of competition 
investigations and attempt to investigate its implications for the role of the legal 
profession in Community law. 
 
4. Comment 
 
4.1. The effectiveness of the rights of the defence in the light of ‘AKZO 
Nobel’: striking the “right balance” 
 
The previous section illustrated that the AKZO Nobel judgment, despite not 
bringing about the awaited reformulation of the existing set of requirements for 
LPP in Community law, made a number of important statements on the 
procedure that Commission officials should follow in determining whether 
evidence seized in the course of investigations was privileged and on the 
nature of the decision rejecting these claims to privilege.   
         Although the CFI confirmed that, in principle, it would be primarily for the 
Commission to carry out the assessment as to the nature of the documents, it 
also emphasised the duty of the investigating officers not to irremediably 
                                                 
78
 Inter alia, MYKOLAITIS, “Developments of legal professional privilege under AKZO/Ackros 
judgment”, (2008) 14(1) Int’l J. of Trade & R. 1 at 5-6. 
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impair the rights of defence of the interested parties in respect to the secrecy 
of potentially privileged evidence.79   
         Especially in cases in which the nature of a given document may not be 
immediately apparent from its external characteristics, it was indispensable to 
avoid the risk that even a “cursory glance” could jeopardise the fairness of the 
proceedings by enabling the Commission officials to seek additional evidence 
against the investigated parties at a later stage of the proceedings.80   
         As a result, the CFI, rather than running the risk of jeopardising the 
overall fairness of the procedure, preferred to adopt a “safer” position 
according to which, in case of conflict, the ultimate decision as to the nature of 
the disputed evidence should be left to the Court itself.81  In other words, it 
could be argued that with the AKZO Nobel decision the Court suggested, 
rather pragmatically, that the investigating officials, once having cast a 
“cursory look” at allegedly privileged evidence, could not suffer from “acute 
amnesia” as regards its content if, at a later stage, that evidence was found to 
be covered by LPP.  In case of dispute, the Commission officers should 
therefore resort to the practice of the “sealed envelope” and should refrain 
from reading the documents until the CFI has adopted a decision.82  
         The views adopted by the Court on this issue should be welcome since 
they emphasise the need to maintain adequate and effective “checks and 
balances” on the Commission investigations.  In this respect, a parallel can be 
drawn with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning 
the admissibility of evidence in criminal and civil cases. Given the limited 
purvey of this case note, it is not possible to survey the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg court concerning the protection of lawyer-client confidentiality.   
         Suffice to say that the European Court of Human Rights recognised in a 
number of judgments83 that the protection against compulsory disclosure of 
communications exchanged between lawyer and client for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice constitutes an essential aspect of the client’s right to a 
fair trial and, more generally, to a “fair hearing” in all legal proceedings 
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involving state authorities, including administrative bodies.84  Protecting the 
secrecy of these exchanges is also necessary to encourage the “candour” of 
the client vis-à-vis his or her legal adviser85 and to allow the provision of more 
reliable legal advice, in accordance with the “special status” enjoyed by the 
lawyer as an intermediary between the public and the courts in the interest of 
the sound administration of justice.86    
         On this specific point, it is noteworthy that the European Court of Human 
Rights preferred to adopt a more “functional” approach to the concept of the 
“professional independence” of the lawyer than the ECJ had done in A.M. & 
S.87 Several of its decisions demonstrate that the existence or otherwise of a 
link of employment with his or her “client” would not be a decisive factor in the 
assessment of whether the legal adviser should be denied the protections 
afforded to him or her by the Convention.88  The Strasbourg Court added that 
even lawyers not belonging to local “Bars” or “law Societies” could benefit from 
these safeguards, providing they are subject to a certain degree of control to 
“ensure professional integrity commensurate to [his or her] role and position.”89   
         In this respect, it must be observed that although “the monitoring and 
supervisory powers vested in Bar councils”90 constitute perhaps the most 
important way in which this control can be exercised, the European Court of 
Human Rights recognised that other means could equally be capable of 
fulfilling that role, such as the “lawyer” being subject to the supervision of the 
trial court in a given case.91  Although it is not possible to investigate in any 
more depth the case law of the Strasbourg Court, the above analysis appears 
to suggest that a closer adherence to the ECHR could justify the adoption of a 
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“positive” notion of lawyers’ independence and, as a result, a more generous 
approach to the concept of LPP in Community law in the future.92 
         The European Court of Human Rights also recognised that, for the rights 
of defence of the investigated or accused parties to be effective, it was 
indispensable that the decisions adopted on these issues always be subject to 
the review of the judicial authorities.93  It was held that when matters related to 
the disclosure of evidence had arisen, adequate procedures allowing a court of 
law to rule on the issue after hearing the interested parties should be in place 
to counterbalance any difficulty caused to the investigated or accused party by 
a limitation of his or her rights of defence.94 
         Against this background, it is argued that the emphasis placed by the 
CFI on the obligation imposed on the investigating officers to respect the 
secrecy of evidence whose nature remains controversial ensures that 
adequate procedural guarantees are in place to preserve the integrity of the 
undertakings’ rights of defence in the course of preliminary investigations and 
is therefore consistent with the Convention standards of “fair hearing”.95   
         The AKZO Nobel decision is also noteworthy for its statements on the 
nature of the decision rejecting a claim of privilege.  It could be argued that the 
judgment demonstrates the willingness of the CFI to interpret rather 
generously the concept of “reviewable act” for the purpose of lodging an action 
for annulment under Article 230 EC Treaty.  According to the IBM case, “only 
measures which produce binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of 
an applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position” may be 
challenged before the Community courts.96  
         However, prior to AKZO Nobel, the CFI and the ECJ had adopted a 
rather restrictive reading of the IBM test, as a result of which acts adopted in 
the course of preparatory proceedings, such as those adopted in the course of 
competition investigations, could not be challenged directly.97  Any allegations 
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that the Commission had acted improperly during its preliminary investigations 
could only be raised during the appeal against the final decision on the merits 
of the allegations of anticompetitive conduct,98 unless the measure complained 
of had been adopted as a result of an “ad hoc procedure”, the outcome of 
which would be “independent of any final decision making a finding of an 
infringement of the competition rules”.99 
         On this point, AKZO Nobel seems to constitute something of a 
watershed.  In its judgment the CFI recognised that, when the Commission 
rejected allegations that evidence seized during an inspection is covered by 
LPP and, as a result, annexed it to the file,100 the current position would not 
afford the investigated undertakings “an adequate degree of protection” of their 
rights of defence.101  The Court pointed out that the proceedings may not even 
be closed by a formal infringement decision on the merits of the individual 
case and, even if that occurred and that decision was later annulled, the 
judgment would not be sufficiently timely and effective to restore the 
consequences resulting from the earlier disclosure of evidence that had then 
turned out to be privileged.102 
         Accordingly, the CFI concluded that the decision rejecting a claim for 
privilege brought to an end a separate, “special procedure, distinct from that 
enabling the Commission to rule on an infringement of the competition rules”, 
and therefore constituted a “reviewable act”103 open to judicial challenge.  The 
Court also expressly acknowledged that the investigated parties could bring an 
action for annulment even when the decision had been adopted “tacitly”, i.e. 
when the Commission had seized a document whose nature was controversial 
and had placed it on the file without putting it into a sealed envelope.104  In the 
Court’s view, “that physical act necessarily [entailed] a tacit decision by the 
Commission to reject the protection claimed by the undertaking (…) and 
[allowed it] to examine the document immediately.”105  
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         The above analysis illustrates that in AKZO Nobel the Court sought to 
strike an appropriate balance between the demands of the effective 
enforcement of the competition rules and the need to protect the rights of 
defence of the investigated parties.106  The resulting circumstance that 
continuous judicial supervision must be in place over the Commission’s 
assessment of the nature of the evidence appears consistent with the 
standards of “fair procedure” enshrined in Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights by ensuring that the rights of defence of the 
undertakings concerned are not irremediably impaired in the course of the 
preliminary stages of the proceedings. 
         However, section 3 also demonstrated that, by reiterating the A.M. & S. 
requirements, the CFI disappointed expectations that the Community notion of 
LPP would be reformulated to allow its scope to expand as far as to cover 
communications emanating from employed counsel.  The implications of the 
AKZO Nobel judgment for the concept of “independence” of legal advisers will 
be examined in the next section. 
 
4.2. The “negative” independence of lawyers in EC law: what is its impact 
on the legal profession in Europe? 
 
Sections 2 and 3 discussed the implications of respectively, the interim order 
and the judgment in the AKZO Nobel case for the scope of LPP in Community 
law.  It was argued that the 2004 order reflected the perception that the A.M. & 
S. test for privilege no longer appeared to reflect the status quo existing in the 
laws of several Member States which allowed employed counsel to become 
members of the local professional organisations and, thus, subjected them to 
the application of the relevant ethical standards, just as independent legal 
advisers.107  Furthermore, several commentators pointed out that the 
enactment of the Modernisation Regulation had resulted in legal advisers, both 
“outside” and “in-house”, becoming increasingly proactive in engaging in the 
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self-assessment of prima facie anti-competitive practices,108 and consequently 
called for greater protection of the secrecy of these communications.109   
         Other authors suggested that the introduction of extensive powers of 
cooperation between the Commission and the National Competition Authorities 
(hereinafter referred to also as NCAs) in the context of the European 
Competition Network (or ECN) could pose additional threats to the effective 
protection of the secrecy of lawyer-client communications.110   
         Vesterdorf observed extra-judicially that Regulation 1/2003 in substance 
allows information to be deployed against the investigated undertakings “even 
if it has been collected under rules which are less protective than those of the 
Commission or the receiving NCA”111 subject only to the limits established by 
Article 12(3) for the protection of individuals.112  Consequently, if the 
Commission were to transmit communications between an investigated 
undertaking and its in-house counsel to another jurisdiction, the competent 
NCA could deploy that evidence in the proceedings, regardless of the higher 
degree of protection afforded in its jurisdiction to lawyer-client confidentiality.113   
       The President of the CFI thus added, still extra-judicially, that recourse to 
Article 12(1), Regulation 1/2003, could prevent the concerned firms from 
claiming protection against forced disclosure of these communications not only 
vis-à-vis the Commission, but also vis-à-vis the receiving national competition 
authority in proceedings enforcing Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty, since it would 
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result in their inability to benefit from more extensive standards of privilege 
available in the jurisdiction where that evidence is received.114  
         Against this background, the interim order was welcomed by some 
commentators as a realistic and reasoned response to the concerns emerging 
from both the developments in the laws of the Member States as regards the 
position of in-house counsel and the features of the “Modernised” framework 
for the enforcement of the Treaty competition rules.115 Its reasoning seemed to 
support the view that the scope of professional privilege should be defined 
solely on the basis of the allegiance of the lawyer to binding rules of ethics.116   
         In the light of the 2004 order, it was thus suggested that a “positive” 
concept of independence, based on the commitment to the observance of ad 
hoc rules of ethics, should replace the “negative” notion of the lawyer’s 
autonomy, which was grounded, instead on the lack of a relationship of 
employment and, thus, of economic dependence between the legal adviser and 
his or her “client”.117  
         The final judgment, however, seemed to be something of a setback.  The 
Court dismissed the allegations that there was a trend across the laws of some 
Member States in favour of recognising the protection of lawyer-client 
confidentiality to communications emanating from employed legal advisers.  It 
preferred to take the view that, given the degree of variance still existing in the 
domestic laws within the EU, reaffirming the A.M. & S. requirements remained 
the most appropriate solution to the issue.118   
         The CFI pointed out that LPP constituted an exception to the extensive 
powers of investigation enjoyed by the Commission, an exception which, in the 
absence of significant changes in the role of legal advisers and especially of 
employed counsel, could not be interpreted widely.119  In that respect, the Court 
held that although devising “self-compliance programmes” had become an 
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increasingly important task for the undertakings’ legal advisers, it could equally 
be conducted by independent lawyers.120  It was emphasised that, in this case, 
communications with the relevant legal departments, provided that they are 
made in the interest and for the purpose of the client’s rights of defence, would 
be privileged, in accordance with A.M. & S.121 
         In the light of the above analysis, it is submitted that reasons of uniformity 
and legal certainty in the determination of what constituted “privileged” 
evidence for the purpose of Community law appear still to constitute the most 
powerful justification for the position of the CFI in AKZO Nobel and, thus, for 
retaining the 1982 concept of LPP.122  On this point, a number of commentators 
had already noted how one of the advantages of the A.M. & S. test was that of 
being reasonably certain: by being based on a “negative” notion of 
independence, it gave unequivocal solutions to the question of whether 
evidence was privileged, even though the position adopted by the laws of the 
various Member States varied.123 
         It is noteworthy that the AKZO Nobel judgment rejected the argument that 
“the personal scope of the Community concept of confidentiality should be 
governed by national law”124 and instead stated that, since the protection of 
secrecy of lawyer-client correspondence had a direct impact on the manner in 
which the Commission exercised its powers in a vital policy area for the 
common market, it was vital to ensure the uniform and effective application of 
the conditions governing these powers.125   
         Accordingly, it may be concluded that on a matter on which the national 
laws adopted different solutions and which could have considerable 
implications for the effective exercise of the Commission’s enforcement 
powers, the CFI preferred to adopt a “lowest common denominator” for the 
definition of the requirements of LPP, for clear reasons of uniformity and legal 
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certainty.126  However, in striking a balance between the protection of the rights 
of defence of the investigated parties and the effective enforcement of the 
competition rules, the Court managed to “tilt the scales” in favour of the 
Commission and of the extensive use of its investigating powers.127   
         The next section will attempt to draw some conclusions on the 
implications of the AKZO Nobel judgment for the effectiveness of the rights of 
defence enjoyed by the investigated undertakings and will especially assess 
the extent to which LPP is adequately protected as a result of the decision 
adopted by the CFI to reaffirm the A.M. & S. test. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  
Overall, the analysis of the AKZO Nobel judgment has tried to illustrate the 
underlying tension between the need to ensure the effective enforcement of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty by the Commission and the protection of the 
rights of defence enjoyed by the investigated undertakings, of which LPP 
constitutes an essential component.128  In this context, the requirements of 
legal certainty an of uniformity in the laws of the Member States play a key role 
in striking a balance between these two competing objectives and, therefore 
are decisive in achieving the solution to the question of where the boundaries 
of the privilege should lie.129 
         The CFI sought to achieve this balance by clarifying the extent of the 
procedural obligations incumbent on the Commission officials in the 
assessment of the nature, whether privileged or otherwise, of the documents 
seized in the course of the competition investigations.  In addition, by stating 
that the decision rejecting, either expressly or tacitly, the claims that this 
evidence is covered by LPP and, accordingly, should not be annexed to the 
file, constitutes a reviewable act for the purpose of an action for annulment ex 
Article 230 EC Treaty, the Court subjected the Commission’s measures 
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impinging upon essential elements of the undertakings’ rights of defence to 
direct judicial supervision.130 
         Although it is acknowledged that the recourse to the “sealed envelope” 
procedure could delay the administrative proceedings and result in the 
Commission becoming the target of litigation in the CFI even before it is 
actually able to rely on the evidence,131 it is submitted that any other solution 
would unduly hamper the rights of defence of the investigated parties, 
especially when the nature of the documents in question is not immediately 
apparent from their external features. 
         In addition, the recognition that, in principle, “preparatory internal 
documents”, namely documents drafted by employed legal advisers for the 
purpose of providing an independent lawyer with the necessary information 
with a view to supplying legal advice, would benefit from the privilege132 
confirms the importance of LPP as an essential component of the undertaking’s 
rights of defence and an indispensable guarantee of “fair procedure” before the 
Commission.133  Overall, in the light of the brief comparative analysis of the 
standards of protection of LPP enshrined in the ECHR,134 it is argued that the 
CFI’s remarks on this point should be welcomed as an attempt to reconcile the 
very essence of the privilege as a means for every person to be “able without 
constraint, to consult a lawyer” in the interest of the sound administration of 
justice135 with the effective enforcement of the Treaty competition rules.136   
         However, the judgment did not bring about the much awaited 
reformulation of the A.M. & S. test for LPP.  It has been argued that the CFI 
decision “perpetuates a discrepancy between the protection afforded by 
privilege to in-house lawyers under the laws of some Member States, including 
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the United Kingdom, and EU law”.137  It was added that AKZO Nobel maintains 
the difference of treatment between the communications emanating from 
counsel employed by investigated parties and those lawyers belonging to the 
EC Legal Service, which are similarly protected against disclosure.138 
         It could be argued that the CFI rejected the arguments in favour of a 
“positive” meaning of “professional independence” based on the lawyer’s 
allegiance to rules of ethics139 because it was concerned that this conclusion 
would result in subordinating the Community notion of privilege to the fulfilment 
of requirements dictated by national law.140    
         On this point, it has been suggested that the Court’s fears may have been 
partly unjustified since the judgment could either have established 
“autonomous criteria in the field of in-house LPP” or could have declared that 
the lawyer in the case at hand satisfied the requirements of “independence”.141  
Also, although it is undeniable that the CFI chose perhaps an “easy way out”, 
based on a “tried-and-tested” formula of LPP,142 its position could perhaps be 
explained in relation to the circumstance that in-house counsel is still allowed 
membership of local “Bars” or “Law Societies” only in a relatively small number 
of Member States.  As a result, it may be suggested that the consensus on 
whether employed legal advisers should be allowed membership to 
professional bodies would not be sufficient to justify a change in the concept of 
“lawyer’s independence” for the purpose of determining LPP.143    
         Seen in this light, it could be argued that the outcome of the case was 
perhaps the most desirable since it ensured continuity with the case law of the 
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ECJ and legal certainty for both the Commission and the investigated parties 
as regards the outcome of claims that evidence should be privileged.144   
         However, if examined against the backdrop of the principles enshrined in 
the ECHR, concerning the function of lawyers in a democratic society and their 
“special status” of intermediaries between the public and the courts, which 
arguably justifies the protection of LPP itself,145 the CFI’s views do not sound 
completely convincing.  As section 4.1 illustrated, the European Court of 
Human Rights has recognised in a number of judgments that the existence of a 
link of employment with his or her client may not be a decisive factor in denying 
a lawyer the safeguards provided to him or her by the ECHR, if in addition the 
legal adviser was subject to a certain degree of control to ensure his or her 
professional integrity.146   
         The case law of the Strasbourg Court also indicated that, although the 
monitoring powers of “Bar Councils” are perhaps the most common form of 
oversight,147 other means, such as the supervision exercised on the lawyer by 
the trial court in a particular case, could be equally effective in fulfilling that 
function.148  Accordingly, it was suggested that an increased degree of 
consistency with the ECHR could justify the future adoption of a “positive” 
notion of lawyer’s independence and consequently the emergence of a more 
generous approach to LPP.149 
         In the light of these considerations, it is clear that the appeal judgment of 
the ECJ150 is widely awaited since it will determine the question of whether LPP 
should be extended to the communications emanating from employed counsel 
and will answer the overarching question of which procedural guarantees 
should be in place to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the 
effective application of the EC competition rules and the meaningful protection 
of the rights of defence of the investigated parties.  Overall, it is expected that 
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the ECJ decision will have a wider impact on the definition of the role of 
lawyers and of the notion of their “professional independence” in EC law for the 
purpose of the provision of independent and sound legal advice and in the 
interest of the efficient and fair administration of justice.   
 
